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LECH'S MESS WITH THE TENTH CIRCUIT: WHY
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ARE NOT EXEMPT
FROM PAYING JUST COMPENSATION WHEN THEY




On June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Lech v. Jackson, a Tenth Circuit inverse condemnation case, which
held that governmental entities are categorically exempt from pay-
ing just compensation when they destroy private property pursuant
to their police powers. This denial of certiorari cements a highly
controversial circuit court holding into our takings jurisprudence-
the effects of which will be serious and far reaching. This article
dissects the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Lech and explains how and
why this holding should be revisited. If it is not, we risk losing the
protection that the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause
provides.
t Emilio R. Longoria received a B.A. in History from Rice University in 2013 and a
J.D. from the University of Texas School of Law in 2017. During the 2018-19 term, Emilio
clerked for the Hon. George C. Hanks, Jr. of the Southern District of Texas. Currently,
Emilio is an attorney for Marrs, Ellis, and Hodge LLP, a Texas-based law firm that specializes
in eminent domain litigation. Emilio would like to thank his family and friends for all their
love and support-without them this article would not have been possible. Lastly, Emilio
would like to thank the entire staff at the Wake Forestjournal of Law & Policy, all remaining
errors are his own.
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[In eminent domain] there is a natural equity which
commends it to every one. It in no wise detracts from
the power of the public to take whatever may be nec-
essary for its uses; while, on the other hand, it pre-
vents the public from loading upon one individual
more than his just share of the burdens of govern-
ment, and says that when he surrenders to the public
something more and different from that which is ex-
acted from other members of the public, a full and
just equivalent shall be returned to him.
- Justice David J. Brewer, Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
L INTRODUCTION
The pages of history probably will not remember June 3, 2015,and if they do, it will not be for constitutional reasons.1 But for
Leo Lech, Alfonsia Lech, John Lech, and Anna Mumzhiyan
(collectively, the "Lechs"), it is a day that they will never forget. That
was the day that the police blew up their house and then refused to
pay for it.2
Now, this event raises an interesting question. Police forces
do not just destroy innocent peoples' homes, and if they did, then
they would certainly pay for the damage. So why should we feel bad
for the Lechs? But as fate would have it, that was not the case here.
On the day in question,John, his girlfriend Anna, and Anna's nine-
year old son were tenants in a Greenwood Village, Colorado home
owned by John's parents, Leo and Alfonsia.3 Self-described as the
kind of place where people went to get away from "the inexorable
advance of urban development,"4 Greenwood Village (the "City")
1. Markian Hawryluk, Houston surgeons perform first skull-scalp transplant, HOUS. CHRON.
(June 4, 2015, 10:31 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/health/article/Houston-sur-
geons-perform-first-skull-scalp-6306721.php#photo-8094965 (revealing that June 3, 2015
was the date that the first skull-scalp transplant was ever completed, a ground-breaking med-
ical event).
2. Bobby Allyn, Police Owe Nothing To Man Whose Home They Blew Up, NPR (Oct. 30,
2019, 5:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/30/774788611/police-owe-nothing-to-
man-whose-h ome-they-blew-u p-appeals-court-says.
3. Id.
4. Greenwood Village is Born, GREENWOOD VILL., https://greenwoodvillage.com/Doc-
umentCenter/View/375/Historical-Greenwood-Village-Is-Born?bidld= (explaining,
ironically, in town's own self-published history how Greenwood Village was incorporated in
order to protect itself against unwanted condemnations).
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was known to be a "safe" Denver suburb with a visible and responsi-
ble police presence.5 So, it was quite the surprise when Anna came
back from a quick trip to the grocery store to find her home sur-
rounded by law enforcement.6
The commotion, Anna learned, was the response by the
Greenwood Village Police, the neighboring Aurora Police Depart-
ment, and the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office (collectively, the
"Police") to the Lechs' home alarm system.7 While she was out, and
with her son still in the house, Robert Seacat ("Seacat"), a suspect
in a local Walmart shoplifting case, had broken in to the Lechs'
home and barricaded himself inside.8 Luckily, Seacat allowed
Anna's son to leave unharmed.9 But because of several reports that
Seacat was armed and potentially dangerous,10 the Police "deemed
the incident a high-risk, barricade situation" and established a pe-
rimeter around the Lechs' home to plan his removal."
Over the next nineteen hours, the Police used increasingly
aggressive strategies to extract Seacat from the Lechs' home.1 2 Spe-
cifically, they fired sixty-eight "40mm (cold) chemical munitions"
and four "hot gas munitions" into the home," used a BearCat ar-
mored vehicle to ram multiple holes into the home," employed
5. Greenwood Village Crime Survey, NICHE, https://www.niche.com/places-to-
live/greenwood-village-arapahoe-co/crime-safety (last visited Sept. 26, 2020).
6. Meagan Flynn, Police blew up an innocent man's house in search of an armed shoplifter.
Too bad, court rules., WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/na-
tion/2019/10/30/police-blew-up-an-innocent-mans-house-search-an-armed-shoplifter-too-
bad-court-rules/.
7. Aff. of Probable Cause for Arrest Warrant at 4, Colorado v. RobertJoh nson Seacat,
15-CR-1557 (D. Ct. Arapahoe Cty. 2015).
8. Michael Roberts, SWAT Team House Destruction Case Could Land at U.S. Supreme
Court, WESTWORD (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.westword.com/con-
tent/printView/ 11662729.
9. SeeFlynn, supra note 6.
10. Complaint and Information at 10, Colorado v. Seacat, 15-CR-1557 (D. Ct. Arapa-
hoe Cnty. 2015) (Seacat was alleged to have a "handgun" at the time).
11. Lech v. Jackson, 791 F. App'x 711, 713 (10th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Lech 2].
12. Id.
13. Phil Hansen & Don Kester, Greenwood Village Incident Review, THE NAT'L TACTICAL
OFFICER'S ASS'N 8 (2015), https://greenwoodvillage.com/Docu-
mentCenter/iew/14272/Incident-Review-3?bidld=.
14. SeeAff. of Probable Cause for Arrest Warrant, supra note 7, at 17; LENCO ARMORED
VEHICLES, Bearcat G3, https://www.lencoarmor.com/model/bearcat-g3-police-govern-
ment (last visited June 16, 2020) (an image of the Bearcat vehicle the Police used on the
Lechs' home).
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explosives to blow open sightlines through the house's walls,'5 and
detonated several chemical agents inside.16 The end result being
"significant damage to all of the upper floor walls, basement back
yard doors and front door" as well as damage to every room in the
house." Moreover, since remnants of the Police's military extrac-
tion were not cleared after their mission was accomplished, the
home itself posed a threat to the Lechs' health and safety.18 For ex-
ample, after the Lechs were allowed to return to their home to col-
lect personal items, they discovered that "[c]hemical munitions
[and] other projectiles were [still] stuck in the walls." 9 And the site
had not been cleared of the drug paraphernalia Seacat brought into
the home before barricading himself inside.20 In fact, on more than
one occasion, Leo Lech nearly pricked himself with "[a] hypoder-
mic needle containing an unknown dark substance . . . [that] was
later found . .. when the Plaintiffs were attempting to recover per-
sonal belongings that were not destroyed.""
In light of the serious damage that Lechs' home sustained
from the Police's extraction methods,22 it came as no surprise that
the house was later pronounced "uninhabitable."23 Indeed, after all
was said and done, the building had more in common with swiss
cheese than a home.24 But what did come as a surprise was the City's
position that it had "[no] obligation" to reimburse the Lechs for the
15. See Aff. of Probable Cause for Arrest Warrant, supra note 7, at 17; Volusia Sheriff's
Office, VCSO SWAT/EOD Explosive Breach Training: 2/27/19, YOUTUBE (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pXkRrcJencA (for a video demonstration of how ex-
plosives are used by the Police to breach a residence).
16. See Aff. of Probable Cause for Arrest Warrant, supra note 7, at 17.
17. Id. at 11; Inside Edition, Town Not Responsible for Damaging Man's Home During
Standoff, YouTUBE (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=leoL3LAu4SI (for
images of the Lechs' home after the Police employed their extraction protocols).
18. First Amended Complaint, Lech v. Jackson, No. 1:16-cv-01956-PAB-MJW, Doc. 4 at
3 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Lech I Complaint].
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Hansen & Kester, supra note 13, at 2.
23. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 713.
24. See Ryan Grenoble, Man Whose House Was Blown Up By Cops Not Entitled To Compen-
sation, Court Rules, HUFF POST (Oct. 31, 2019, 4:48 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/en-
tiy/leo-lech-home-compensation-swat_n_5dbb2lb6e4b0bblea376flac (images of the after-
math at the Lech residence).
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destruction caused by its police department.25 As the City saw it, the
"Greenwood Village Police Department actions ... were taken to
preserve life, and were at all times conducted in an appropriate
manner and in accord with their recognized and lawful police pow-
ers."2 6 Therefore, the City felt, it could not be held accountable for
real or personal property lost during the actions it undertook.2" Alt-
hough the City was willing, as a courtesy, to offer "$5,000 to pay the
Lechs' insurance deductible and provide for temporary housing,"28
it "denied any liability for the incident and declined to provide fur-
ther compensation."2
Literally homeless and lacking the funds necessary to repair
the damage done, the Lechs filed suit against the City and the indi-
vidual officers involved in destroying their home in the District
Court for Arapahoe County Colorado to obtain just compensa-
tion.30 In for a penny, in for a pound, the Lechs asserted several
claims in their original complaint: "(1) taking withoutjust compen-
sation in violation of the U.S. and Colorado constitutions; (2) de-
nial of plaintiffs' due process rights under the U.S. and Colorado
constitutions; (3) trespass; (4) negligence; (5) negligent infliction
of emotional distress; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional
distress.""' Although varied, each of these claims revolved around
the same themes-the City should not be able to avoid responsibil-
ity for destroying the Lechs' home by mere virtue of being a govern-
ment entity,32 and the Lechs should not be required to pay out-of-
pocket to return their lives back to normal.33
On its face, it is difficult not to sympathize with the Lechs'
arguments. As they pled in their complaint, the Lechs "suffered eco-
nomic damages ... [and] severe emotional damage" resulting from
25. Greenwood Village Response to U.S. Court of Appeals, 1U Circuit - Leo Lech Case,




28. Id. Additionally, the City argued, the Lechs were not left with nothing. In fact, the
Lechs received "approximately $345,000 following this critical incident, which [they] ap-
parently used to build a much larger and more expensive home." Id.
29. Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Lech v. Jackson, No. 16-cv-01956-PAB-
MJW Doc. 115, at 6 (D. Colo. Jan. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Lech 1 Order].
30. See generally Lech 1 Complaint, supra note 18, at 6.
31. Lech 1 Order, supra note 29, at 7.
32. Lech 1 Complaint, supra note 18, at 6.
33. Id.
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the City's actions.3 4 The consequences of these damages have been
far reaching. The Lechs lost their home, their jobs, their friends,
and even their dogs35-not to mention a priceless family heir-
loom.3 6 All of which, no party disputes, was done for the public's
benefit." So why then, the Lechs' suggested, should they be forced
to manage this burden alone with no compensation from the City?38
And why should they be singled out to carry a civic duty that was
greater, and different, than that of their neighbors?
Ironically for the Lechs, "our forefathers long ago envi-
sioned that this .. . may happen."3 That at some point "an unlucky
few would need to sacrifice their property rights for the benefit of
all."" And their solution was clear: if the government finds itself in
the uncomfortable situation of needing to take "private property"
for a "public use," it has a duty to provide those unlucky landowners
with 'just compensation" for the property taken." Indeed, doing so
achieves two constitutional promises. First, it guarantees that "some
people alone [will not have] to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."4 2
And second, it ensures "the security of Property, which Alexander
Hamilton described to the Philadelphia Convention as one of the
great objects of Government."4 3 Moreover, and perhaps more im-
portantly, it preserves the "natural equity" between governmental
entities and their residents." By providing just compensation in sit-
uations like these, the public still gets to take whatever property it
may need. While, on the other hand, we ensure that no one
34. Id.
35. Id. at 4-5 ("The Lech Home was completely uninhabitable ... ").
36. Id. at 5 ("A ring and family heirloom that survived through WWII Italy was never
recovered from the Lech Home.").
37. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 717.
38. See generally Lech I Complaint, supra note 18.
39. Emilio R. Longoria, The Case for the Rodeo: An Analysis of the Houston Livestock Show
and Rodeo's Inverse Condemnation Case Against the City of Houston, 52 ST. MARY'S L. J. (forth-
coming Jan. 2021).
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V (". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("No person's property shall
be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensa-
tion being made.").
42. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
43. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
44. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
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individual is forced to provide something more or different from
that taken from the other members of the public.45
Unfortunately, the courts did not feel the same way. After
removal to federal court, Judge Phillip A. Brimmer of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court of Colorado entered summary judgment in favor of the
City and its officers on the Lechs' federal inverse condemnation
claim.47 In coming to his decision, Judge Brimmer "distinguished
between the state's eminent-domain authority, which permits the
taking of private property for public use, and the state's police
power, which allows [it] to regulate private property for the protec-
tion of public health, safety, and welfare."8 "[A]lthough a state may
trigger[] the requirement of just compensation by exercising the
former," the District Court held, "a state's exercise of the latter does
not constitute a taking and is therefore noncompensable."' Since
the Police were merely enforcing state criminal law when they ex-
tracted Seacat from the Lechs' home-and "the state's police power
encompasses the enforcement of a state's criminal laws"-the Po-
lice's actions did not sound in eminent domain." Accordingly, the
District Court dismissed the Lechs' federal inverse condemnation.5 '
45. Id.
46. Lech I Order, supra note 29, at 7.
47. Id. at 29. After dismissing the Lechs' inverse condemnation claim, the Court also
dismissed both the procedural due process claim and substantive due process claim. Having
dismissed all of the Lechs' federal claims at that point, the Court denied an exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction over the Lechs' remaining state law claims; see also Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980) ("Inverse condemnation should be distinguished from emi-
nent domain. Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding in which a government asserts
its authority to condemn property. Inverse condemnation is a shorthand description of the
manner in which a landowner recoversjust compensation for a taking of his property when
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.") (internal citations omitted). How-
ever, a party found culpable of inverse condemnation can be correctly described as having
exercised eminent domain.
48. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 713-14 (internal quotations omitted).
49. Id. at 714.
50. Id.
51. Lech 1 Order, supra note 29, at 31-32.
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Floored by the Court's reasoning,52 the Lechs appealed the
District Court order as to their inverse condemnation claim.53 In a
relatively short, unanimous opinion authored by Judge Nancy L.
Moritz, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court's reasoning."
"[D]espite the considerable appeal of [the Lechs' position] as a
matter of policy," Judge Moritz wrote, the Lechs "failed to state a
claim for compensation under the Fifth Amendment," because "the
government's exercise of authority was pursuant to some power
other than eminent domain."" "[W]hen the state acts to preserve
the safety of the public," she reasoned, "the state is not, and, con-
sistent with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be,
burdened with the condition that the state must compensate af-
fected property owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain in the
process."" "The innocence of the property owner does not factor
into the determination."57 "[A]s unfair as it may seem," Judge
Moritz wrote, "the Takings Clause simply does not entitle all ag-
grieved owners to recompense.1"58
Simply put, neither the Constitution nor its historical inter-
pretation support the Tenth Circuit's decision. This article points
outjust that, in the hopes of dissuading other courts and practition-
ers from following in Lech's footsteps. Contrary to the Tenth Cir-
cuit's holding, the Takings Clause was enacted by our forefathers to
ensure that families like the Lechs are compensated when their
property is haplessly conscripted.59 The Takings Clause of the
52. See CBS Denver, Greenwood Village Doesn't Owe Leo Lech Anything Federal Court Ruling
Says, YOUTUBE (Oct 30, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=L_2yobk4jVQ. Later,
in an interview with CBS Denver, Leo Lech would go on to say that this process taught him
that he "has no rights." Id. See also Ananda Pampuro, Couple Argues Eminent Domainfor Home
Destroyed in Police Standoff, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.court-
housenews.com/couple-argues-eminen t-domain-for-home-destroyed-in-police-standoff. Af-
ter the District Court's decision Rachel Maxam, the Lechs' attorney gave an interview where
she explained that the decision was "an unseen expansion of police powers in that property
can be destroyed in the name of enforcing the law." Id.
53. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 714. "The Lechs also alleged various other claims. But they
do not challenge the district court's resolution of those claims on appeal. Accordingly, we
discuss the Lechs' remaining claims only to the extent they are relevant to our Takings
Clause analysis." Id. at 714 n.5.
54. Id. at 719.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 717.
57. Id. at 719.
58. Id. at 717.
59. Richard Epstein & Eduardo Penalver, The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, NAT'L
CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interacinte-
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Constitution does not require the Lechs to shoulder any other "un-
fair" result." Indeed, by saying as much, the Tenth Circuit seriously
jeopardizes the constitutional right to just compensation. As of the
publication of this article, in fact, at least six courts have already
cited the Tenth Circuit's opinion in their denial of inverse condem-
nation claims made after property was destroyed pursuant to a gov-
ernmental entity's use of its police powers.6' Who knows how many
more will do the same in the coming months and years in light of
the Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari in this case.6 2
Hardly trivial, the fallout from this decision could have seri-
ous consequences. Notjust because any one could be in the Lechs'
shoes, but because such a decision erodes the constitutional protec-
tions for property on which our society depends. As the Supreme
Court noted in Horne v. Department ofAgriculture, the Takings Clause
was created in "response to the arbitrary and oppressive mode of
obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by impress-
ment, as was too frequently practiced during the revolutionary war,
without any compensation whatever."3 Because, even to early
Americans, the thought that the government may be able to com-
mandeer property without just compensation caused so much fear
and concern." For the Tenth Circuit to suggest that a government
constitution/interpretation/amendmeam-v/clauses/634 (last visited Sept. 20, 2020) (a pri-
mer on the Fifth Amendment).
60. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 717.
61. See Emesowum v. Arlington Cty., Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-113, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99701, n. 9 (E. D. Va. June 5, 2020) (citing Lech 2, supra note 11, for the proposition
that "damage to private property in the course of law enforcement's exercise of its police
power, [cannot] amount to a government taking under the Fifth Amendment."); see also
Yawn v. Dorchester Cty., 446 F. Supp. 3d 41, 45-46 (D.S.C. 2020) (same); see also Britton v.
Keller, Case No. 1:19-cv-01113 KWR/JHR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68413, at *7-8 (D. New.
Mex. Apr. 16, 2020) (same); Almond v. Randolph Cty., Case No. 3:19-cv-175-RAH, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99539, at *28-30 (Md. D. Al. June 8, 2020) (same); Ostipow v. Federspiel, No.
18-2448, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 26242, at *11 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2020) (same); TJM 64, Inc.
v. Harris, No. 2:20-cv-02498-JPM-tmp, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134037 (W.D. Tenn. July 29,
2020) (same).
62. Lech v.Jackson, No. 19-1123,2020 U.S. LEXIS 3417, 2020 WL 3492667, at *1 (June
29, 2020) ("Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit denied.").
63. Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 359 (2015) (internal citation omitted).
64. Id. ("[E]arly Americans bridled at appropriations of their personal property dur-
ing the Revolutionary War, at the hands of both sides. John Jay, for example, complained
to the NewYork Legislature about military impressment by the Continental Army of Horses,
Teems, and Carriages, and voiced his fear that such action by the little Officers of the Quar-
termasters Department might extend to Blankets, Shoes, and many other articles.") (inter-
nal citations omitted).
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is categorically exempted from the Just Compensation Clause when
it acts pursuant to its police powers could not be further from the
truth. The Supreme Court has long allowed for the recovery ofjust
compensation when property has been impaired pursuant to a gov-
ernmental entity's use of its police powers.65 And not affirming this
now impermissibly allows a citizen to "bear" more than "his [fair]
quota of [a] loss.""
What is more terrifying: the fact that the government would
have to pay ajust amount for the property it destroys pursuant to its
police powers, or that it would be exempt from paying a dime, re-
gardless of the motivations behind its actions? To what degree can
we really trust our officers not to abuse a blanket exemption from
paying just compensation? And who is in the best position to foot
the bill for the kind of damage the Lechs experienced? These are
all questions this article will attempt to answer.
II. LECH'S FAULTY PREMISE
In coming to its holding that governmental entities are cat-
egorically exempt from payingjust compensation when they destroy
private property pursuant to their police powers, the Tenth Circuit
cited several Supreme Court cases, which actually support the op-
posite conclusion.67 An avoidable mistake, the Tenth Circuit's mis-
step could have been prevented had it adhered to Justice Gins-
burg's first rule of interpreting case law, "Read on."68 Considering
the faulty premise on which the Tenth Circuit relied, any meaning-
ful discussion about how, and why, the Tenth Circuit came to the
wrong result in the Lech's dispute must start with re-contextualizing
these foundational cases.6 9
65. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-68 (1946) (finding that the
Federal Government took an aerial easement from a nearby chicken farm in its use of an
army airfield base, regardless of the fact that the Federal Government had the right to op-
erate said base pursuant to its police powers).
66. Id.
67. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887); see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516
U.S. 442, 443-44 (1996); see also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928).
68. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 36 (2012) (emphasis
added); Loc. Union 1261, Dist. 22, United Mine Workers v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Re-
view Comm'n, 917 F.2d 42, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("If the first rule of statutory construction is
Read, the second rule is Read On!") (internal quotations omitted) (Ginsburg,J.).
69. For editorial reasons, this article has limited its review of the case law cited in the
Lech opinion to the Supreme Court cases cited. However, the Lech Court did cite several
circuit court opinions as well.
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A. Mugler v. Kansas
The Tenth Circuit's opinion begins by citing Mugler v. Kan-
sas, a nineteenth-century Supreme Court case, which confronted
whether the State of Kansas effected a taking by passing prohibition
regulations that prohibited a brewery from continuing its opera-
tions.70 That case, the Tenth Circuit argued, was the first time the
Supreme Court acknowledged a "hard line between those actions
the government performs pursuant to its power of eminent domain
and those it performs pursuant to its police power . .. in the context
of regulatory takings."71 Since such a distinction exists in regulatory
takings, the Tenth Circuit reasoned, the same must be true for phys-
ical takings cases.7" Thus, the Tenth Circuit extended the Supreme
Court's purported holding in Mugler to physical takings cases, ra-
ther than treating them differently than their regulatory counter-
parts.73 This formed the flawed basis of the Tenth Circuit's holding
that governmental entities are categorically exempt from paying
just compensation when they physically destroy private property
pursuant to their police powers, as opposed to their powers of emi-
nent domain.7 4
First, and perhaps most importantly, the Tenth Circuit fun-
damentally misunderstood the Mugler holding. Mugler did not rec-
ognize a compensable distinction between "those actions the gov-
ernment performs pursuant to its power of eminent domain and
those it performs pursuant to its police power ... in the context of
regulatory takings."75 Rather, it denied a regulatory takings claim by
comparing it against a more intrusive example of governmental in-
terference with private property rights-a physical intrusion made
pursuant to a state's use of its police powers.76 This is wholly
70. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 653-54 (this case was also combined with a related challenge
to Kansas' criminal statutes, which prohibited the sale and manufacturing of liquor; how-
ever, the discussion about that aspect of the case is not relevant to this article).
71. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 715 (quoting Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69).
72. Id. (under eminent domain "property may not be taken for public use without
compensation," however, states are not "burdened with the condition that [they] must com-
pensate [affected] individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain" due to the use
of their police powers).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 719.
75. Id. at 715.
76. See, e.g., Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667-68 (comparing the Petitioner's regulatory takings
case against the Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. case, which involved a direct physical intrusion to
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different from suggesting, as the Tenth Circuit did, that Mugler cat-
egorically prohibited just compensation for regulatory takings
claims that arise out of a state's use of its police powers." As a result,
Mugler cannot rightly be described as supporting the proposition
ascribed to it by the Tenth Circuit that regulatory takings claims
arising out of a state's use of its police powers are not compensable,
while regulatory takings claims arising out of eminent domain are
compensable.
Although such a prohibition against compensation for reg-
ulatory takings claims arising out of a state's use of its police powers
may have existed at one point, that is no longer the case. As Justice
Scalia explained in Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Counsel, at the time Mugler
was decided, "it was generally thought that the Takings Clause
reached only a direct appropriation of property . . . or the func-
tional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner's possession."78
However, the Supreme Court has long since abandoned this narrow
idea of what qualifies as a compensable taking.79 Indeed, it was Jus-
tice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon who first recog-
nized that a landowner could be compensated for a regulatory tak-
ings claim that arose out of a state's use of its police power.8 0 "[I]f
the protection against physical appropriations of private property
was to be meaningfully enforced," Holmes realized, "the govern-
ment's power to redefine the range of interests included in the own-
ership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional lim-
its" 8 -namely the Fifth Amendment. If it were not, "the uses of
private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualifi-
cation under the police power, the natural tendency of human na-
ture would be to extend the qualification more and more until at
build a dam, and ultimately denying the Petitioner's case because it did not implicate as
severe an intrusion with private property rights as Pumpelly).
77. See Lech 2, supra note 11, at 715.
78. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
79. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated" pursuant to a state's police powers "to a cer-
tain extent, if regulation goes too far itwill be recognized as a taking."); see alsoTahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325-327 (2002) (holding that
the Court has a duty to compensate landowners for police power regulations that go "too
far" in restricting a landowner's use of the property, "generally eschew[ing] any set formula"
to determine what "too far" means).




last private property disappeared."82 Thus, neither the Supreme
Court nor Mugler have ever suggested that there is a compensable
distinction between eminent domain claims and police powers
claims in the regulatory context.
Even accepting, arguendo, that such a distinction between a
state's eminent domain powers and police powers exists in the reg-
ulatory context, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly proposed that the
same should hold true for physical takings like the Lechs' case.83
Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. As the Supreme
Court explained in Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency,
[the] longstanding distinction [s] between [physical]
acquisitions of property for public use, on the one
hand, and [police power] regulations prohibiting
private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to
treat cases involving physical takings as controlling
precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there
has been a regulatory taking, and vice versa."
That is because "[]and-use regulations are ubiquitous and
most of them impact property values in some tangential way-often
in completely unanticipated ways."8 5 Whereas, "[b]y contrast, phys-
ical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually
represent a greater affront to individual property rights."86 .
The inapplicability of the Mugler holding to the Lech's phys-
ical takings case is further confirmed by a review of the Supreme
Court cases cited in the opinion. In deciding Mugler, for example,
the Supreme Court cited its opinion in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. with
approval.87 There, the Supreme Court had to decide whether a gov-
ernment's unintentional flooding of private land to build a dam ef-
fected a taking.' Although the petitioner's land was physically in-
undated with water, the Government argued that there was no
taking within the Constitution's meaning because the resulting
damage was merely consequence of necessary improvements to
82. Id. (internal citations omitted).
83. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 715.
84. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 323 (internal quotations omitted).
85. Id. at 324.
86. Id.
87. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 667-68 (1887).
88. Id.; see alsoPumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177 (1871).
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local waterway infrastructure, which the "government had a right
to" carry out pursuant to its police powers.8 9 In deciding in favor of
the landowner, the Pumpelly Court explained why, contrary to the
Government's arguments, even unintentional physical appropria-
tions that resulted from a state's proper use of its police powers still
effected a taking:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if
in construing a provision of constitutional law, always
understood to have been adopted for protection and
security to the rights of the individual as against the
government, and which has received the commenda-
tion ofjurists, statesmen, and commentators as plac-
ing the just principles of the common law on that
subject beyond the power of ordinary legislation to
change or control them, it shall be held that if the
government refrains from the absolute conversion of
real property to the uses of the public it can destroy
its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and perma-
nent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to
total destruction without making any compensation,
because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not
taken for the public use. Such a construction would
pervert the constitutional provisions into a re-
striction upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights
stood at the common law, instead of the government,
and make it an authority for invasion of private right
under the pretext of the public good, which had no
warrant in the laws or practices of our ancestors.90
Sidestepped by the Tenth Circuit entirely, the Mugler Court
cited Pumpelly precisely because it believed that regulatory takings
and physical takings should be treated differently." As the Mugler
court explained, there is a staunch difference between governmen-
tal acts that result in the "physical invasion of the real estate of the
private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession," and those
that merely prohibit a "use of property for purposes that are de-
clared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community" while not "directly encroaching upon
89. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667; see also Lech 2, supra note 11, at 714 (police powers are the
state's general ability "to regulate private property for the protection of public health, safety,
and welfare.").
90. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177.
91. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667-68.
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private property."9 2 Namely, the directness and degree with which
one's right to quietly enjoy property is interfered.
Governmental entites, the Mugler court continued, have
broad authority to prohibit "such use by individuals of their property
as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the
public." 93 And when they do so, they should not be "burdened with
the condition that the state must compensate such individual own-
ers for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not be-
ing permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury
upon the community."94 However, this "is very different from taking
property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property
without due process of law."95 In that circumstance, just compensa-
tion must be provided.96
This makes sense. In the regulatory context, enactment of a
rule or regulation by a state pursuant to its police powers is likely to
have "tangential," "unanticipated," and unquantifiable effects on
the private use of property.9 7 It is no surprise therefore that courts
are wary of compensating landowners for such diminished uses and
that they have installed a measured ad hoc inquiry to determine
when doing so is appropriate.9 8 Moreover, these unquantifiable ef-
fects can often be justified by pointing to marginal returns to the
public fisc or the abatement of a nuisance.9 9 However, that is not
the case in the context of physical takings. Like in Pumpelly, physical
invasions of property made pursuant to. a state's police powers are
"relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater af-
front to individual property rights,"1 00 in large part because such
invasions often result in "unoffending property [being] taken away
from an innocent owner" with few easily identifiable benefits in
92. Id. at 668-69.




97. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'] Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
(2002).
98. Id.; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (for
the Supreme Court factors that must be analyzed to determine whether a regulation created
pursuant to a state's police powers effects a taking: (1) "[t]he economic impact of the reg-
ulation on the claimant," (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations," and (3) "the character of the governmental action.").
99. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
100. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 324.
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return.101 For that reason, they represent a greater affront to "the
security of Property," which Alexander Hamilton described "as one
of the great objects of Government. "1 02 For the Tenth Circuit to
hold otherwise in the Lech opinion allows states to "pervert the con-
stitutional provisions" meant to protect citizens from government
tyranny, into mechanisms that justify "the invasion of private right
under the pretext of the public good."103
B. Bennis v. Michigan
Regardless of the adverse precedent in Mugler, the Tenth
Circuit relied on two different Supreme Court cases' for the prop-
osition that "although the Supreme Court has never expressly in-
voked [a] distinction" between eminent domain cases and police
powers cases, it has "implicitly indicated [that such a] distinction
applies in [the] context" of "physical taking[s]."" However, like
with Mugler, the Tenth Circuit mischaracterized these Supreme
Court holdings. Hardly trivial, this misstep contributed to the Tenth
Circuit's flawed opinion in the Lechs' case. Therefore, these cases
must also be re-contextualized in order to unwind the Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion. Since the Tenth Circuit discussed Bennis v. Michigan
first, 106 this article will also discuss the Tenth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of that case first as well.
In Bennis, the Supreme Court was charged with deciding
whether the State of Michigan effected a taking when it forfeited an
automobile that was used in the course of committing a crime with-
out first providing an offset for an interest held by an innocentjoint
owner.0 7 By doing this, the petitioner argued, the State of Michigan
deprived her of "her interest in the forfeited car without due
101. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
102. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 178 (1872).
104. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443-44 (1996); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,
277 (1928).
105. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 716. The Tenth Circuit also relied on three Circuit Court
opinions (AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149, 1150, 1153-54 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Zitter v. Petruccelli, 744 F. App'x 90, 93, 96 (3d Cir. 2018); Johnson v. Manitowoc
Cty., 635 F.3d 331, 333-34, 336 (7th Cir. 2011)) and one Federal Court of Claims opinion
(See Bachmann v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 694, 696 (Fed. Cl. 2017)) for this same propo-
sition. Id. However, as these cases are not binding on all jurisdictions, this article will focus
on the Supreme Court decisions on which these cases also rely.
106. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 442.
107. Id. at 443.
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process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment," and it took
"her interest for public use without compensation, in violation of
the Fifth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'08 Because it did so, the petitioner believed she was owed
compensation in the amount of her one-half interest in the vehi-
cle.109
In a 5-4 decision,1 0 the Supreme Court decided in favor of
the state on the petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment claim,"' and
as a consequence, the Court reasoned, that the state also had to win
on the petitioner's Fifth Amendment claim.1 12 "[I]f the forfeiture
proceeding here in question did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," Judge Rehnquist explained, then "the property in the auto-
mobile was transferred by virtue of that proceeding from petitioner
to the State" and there was no taking.11 3 This result was required by
"a long and unbroken line of cases [which] hold[] that an owner's
interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which
the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was
to be put to such use.""4 Therefore, the Court held, "[t]he govern-
ment [could] not be required to compensate an owner for property
which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of govern-
mental authority other than the power of eminent domain.""5
In total, the segment of the Bennis opinion relating to the
Fifth Amendment is three sentences long. 6 More accurately de-
scribed as dicta, these sections were not central to the Court's hold-
ing. Accordingly, they are not binding on any subsequent court." 7
108. Id. at 446.
109. Id. at 444-45. Oddly enough, the vehicle in question was "an 11-year-old Pontiac
sedan recently purchased by John and Tina Bennis for $600." Id. So even if the Court as-
sumed that the car had not depreciated a dime, Ms. Bennis' interest in the car was $300 at
most.
110. See id. at 443 (Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Jus-
tices O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Ginsburg joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justices Souter, Breyer, and Kennedy joined).
111. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 450-52.
112. Id. at 452.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 446. Importantly for our purposes, the "long and unbroken line of cases," to
which the Bennis Court referred in reaching this holding all involved confiscated property
which was instrumental in completing the alleged crime. See id. at 446-48.
115. Id. at 442.
116. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452.
117. See Obiter dictum, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/obiterdic-
tum (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (noting that dictum is not legally binding).
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For the Tenth Circuit to suggest that the Bennis opinion's dicta
about the Fifth Amendment "implicitly" supports a compensable
"distinction" between eminent domain cases and police powers
cases in the context of "physical taking[s]" is an exaggeration of the
Court's holding."8 The reason dicta is not given the same respect
as a case's holding is "obvious."" 9 As Justice Marshall explained in
Cohens v. Virginia, a case's holding is treated with reverence because
"[t]he question actually before the Court is investigated with care,
and considered in its full extent."20 "Other principles which may
serve to illustrate [a case's holding]," like dicta "are considered in
their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all
other cases is seldom completely investigated."'2' For this reason,
the Supreme Court frowns on inflating the importance of language
attendant o a holding. 122
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's mischaracterization of the Supreme Court's Fifth Amend-
ment dicta in Bennis is particularly egregious, because the Bennis
opinion discusses the importance of not overstating the weight of
the Court's dicta.12 ' AsJustice Rehnquist pointed out, the petitioner
in Bennis cited language from Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co. in her brief before the Court," which she insinuated supported
her position that her car should not have been forfeited withoutjust
compensation because she was "uninvolved ... and unaware of the
wrongful activity" the car was used for. 125 However, the Court cor-
rected, this was merely obiter dictum. 12 "[I]t is to the holdings of our
cases," Rehnquist reminded us, "rather than their dicta, that [the
Court] must attend."2 7 Therefore, it is especially frustrating to see
the Tenth Circuit make the same mistake as the petitioner in Bennis.
Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's exaggeration of the
dicta in Bennis, its opinion also misinterprets the Bennis holding.
118. L2ech 2, supra note 11, at 716.




123. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1996).
124. Id. (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974)).
125. Id.
126. Id.




Specifically, the Tenth Circuit misunderstands the context in which
the Supreme Court tolerated the confiscation of the petitioner's
property without compensation. For example, the Tenth Circuit's
opinion cherry-picked the language from Bennis, which most
strongly supported its holding that governmental entities are ex-
empt from paying just compensation when they destroy property
pursuant to their police powers: "when [a] state acquires property
'under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power
of eminent domain,' government is not 'required to compensate an
owner for [that] property."1 28 By selectively citing to the Bennis
opinion in this way, the Tenth Circuit gives the impression that the
Court has long held that there is a "distinction between the state's
police power and the power of eminent domain in cases involving
the government's direct physical interference with private prop-
erty."1 2 ' But in reality, nothing could be further from the truth.
Indeed, a quick dive into the cases cited by the Bennis Court
for this soundbite proves that this is not the case. In explaining its
holding in Bennis, for example, the Court relied heavily on three
Supreme Court forfeiture cases from the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries:130 The Palmyra,1 ' Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 1 2
and Van Oster v. Kansas.133 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court
tolerated the uncompensated forfeiture of personal property used
in committing a crime.1 3 4 However, the state allowed for the prop-
erty in these cases to be forfeited without compensation for several
very specific reasons: (1) the forfeited items presented a threat in
and of themselves,1 35 (2) the forfeited property was volitionally en-
trusted to the criminal perpetrators,136 (3) forfeiting the property
128. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 716 (citing Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453-54).
129. Id. at 715.
130. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 446-48.
131. Id. at 446-47 (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827)).
132. Id. (citing Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877)).
133. Id. (citing Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926)).
134. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 17-18; see also Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401-02; see
also Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468.
135. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 8 ("The brig Palmyra is an armed vessel, asserting herself
to be a privateer, and acting under a commission of the King of Spain, issued by his author-
ized officer at the Island of Porto Rico."); see also Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 396 ("[T]he
real and personal property" seized was a distillery and the items necessary to run it, which
was illegal at the time); see also Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 465-66 (the property seized was a car
that was used to smuggle illegal contraband).
136. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 13 (the vessel was the property of the alleged pirates); see
also Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 396 (the real and personal property used to run the still
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achieved "punitive and remedial" goals,137 and (4) the property in
question was vital evidence to the criminal prosecution of the
crimes in question.18 Uncompensated forfeiture in those situations
was therefore the fruit of a careful ad hoc inquiry into conflicting
constitutional goals: the security of property and criminal deter-
rence. Not, as the Tenth Circuit suggested in Lech, because there
was a bright-line rule against compensation when property is taken
pursuant to the police power.'39 Justice Rehnquist suggested that
had the Petitioner in Bennis been able to prove that she was "'in no
way ... involved in the criminal enterprise carried on by [the] les-
see' and 'had no knowledge that its property was being used in con-
nection with or in violation of [state law],"' the Bennis case may have
turned out differently.14 0 Unfortunately, the petitioner in Bennis
failed to make such a showing." However, that does not mean that
the same holds true for the Lechs here. Indeed, unlike in Bennis, it
is beyond dispute that the Lechs were in "no way ... involved in the
criminal enterprise carried on by [Seacat] and [that they] had no
knowledge that [their] property was being used in connection with
or in violation of [state law]."' 4 2
Moreover, in addition to misunderstanding the reasoning
behind the Bennis opinion, the Tenth Circuit ignored self-imposed
limits on the case's holding.4 3 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit ig-
nored Bennis' explicit requirement that any uncompensated forfei-
ture be proportional to the health, safety, or welfare goals purport-
edly being achieved by a state."" For example, in rejecting concerns
belonged to the alleged criminals); see also Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 465-66 (the owner of the
vehicle entrusted it to an associate who used it to illegally transport liquor).
137. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 15 (forfeiting the vessel served as punishment to the pi-
rates); see also Dobbins'sDistillery, 96 U.S. at 401-03 (forfeiting the still and its appurtenances
served as punishment to the distillers); see also Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 465-66 (forfeiting the
vehicle served as punishment o the alleged criminal).
138. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 8 (the ship was evidence of privateering); see also Dob-
bins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 396 (the site and tools used to distill were evidence of the crime of
illegal production of alcohol); see also Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 465-466 (the vehicle was evi-
dence of the crime of illegal transportation of alcohol).
139. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 716-17, 719.
140. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1996) (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 (1974)).
141. Id. ("Petitioner has made no showing beyond that here.").
142. Id. (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 668); see also Lech 2, supra note 11 at 712-14
(the Lechs were victims of Seacat's crime and in fact helped the police apprehend Seacat).




by the dissent that the majority opinion may 'justify the confiscation
of an ocean linerjust because one of its passengers inned while on
board," Judge Rehnquist explained that such a disproportionate
forfeiture would not be justifiable under existing case law. 4' This is
particularly important because this proportionality requirement
undercuts the Tenth Circuit's holding in Lech that governmental
entities are categorically exempt from paying just compensation
when they destroy property pursuant to their police powers-what-
ever the scale of destruction.146 If that were the case, why then would
the Court require some measure of proportionality in state forfei-
tures in Bennis? By the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, governmental en-
tities should be insulated from paying just compensation once they
confiscate property pursuant to their police powers, no questions
asked. As that is obviously not the case, it is difficult to understand
how the Tenth Circuit believed that the Bennis opinion supported
such a rule.
C. Miller v. Schoene
Next, the Tenth Circuit cited Miller v. Schoene in support of
its position that the Supreme Court has "implicitly indicated" that
there is a compensable "distinction" between property taken pursu-
ant to a state's police powers and that taken pursuant to its eminent
domain powers in the context of "physical taking[s]."1147 However,
as with Bennis, the Tenth Circuit misstated this holding.14 ' Not only
does Millernot support such a distinction between eminent domain
and police powers cases, but in fact, it actually supports the idea of
providing compensation to landowners for the costs attendant to
the execution of a state's police powers.149
In Miller, for example, the question before the Court was
whether a Virginia statute that empowered the state's entomologist
to order the destruction of certain trees in order to prevent the
spread of a plant disease was constitutional under the Fourteenth
145. Id. at 450. ("None of our cases have held that an ocean liner may be confiscated
because of the activities of one passenger.").
146. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 717.
147. Id. at 714-15.
148. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 280-81 (1928) (finding that removal of pri-
vately-owned trees was allowed pursuant to state police power, and tree owners were entitled
to $100 in compensation for removal).
149. Id.
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Amendment's Due Process Clause.150 In ruling that it was, the Court
explained that state legislatures have broad authority to eliminate
public nuisances that threaten "the preservation of [a] class of prop-
erty" which, "in [their] judgment" is "of greater value to the pub-
lic." 5 1 However, this power to choose winners and losers does not
come without potential costs. In so holding, for instance, the Miller
Court affirmed a payment of one hundred dollars to the landowner
to cover the cost of the tree removal.152 And the Court took careful
time to explain that such police power authority was not un-
bounded. Indeed, as Judge Stone put it, had certain characteristics
of the Virginia cedar rust statute been different, such as vesting the
decision of whether to destroy cedar trees with "private citizens" ra-
ther than the state entomologist,"' or had there not been a legisla-
tive investigation and determination to value a community concern
"over the property interest of the individual," the case may have
turned out differently. 54
There are several key differences between the Miller case and
the Lechs' case, making it inappropriate to apply Miller here. First
and foremost, Miller is not a takings case.5 5 Indeed, the Miller opin-
ion goes to great lengths to explain that it is interpreting the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Fifth
Amendment.1 5 6 Therefore, it strains credulity to understand how
the Tenth Circuit came to the conclusion that that Miller spoke so
forcefully about the limits of the Just Compensation Clause, when
in reality, it did nothing of the sort." 57
Second, and perhaps most importantly, Miller "implicitly in-
dicated"15 1 that landowners should be compensated for the costs at-
tendant to the destruction of their private property.5 1 Specifically,
the Miller Court did this by affirming a one hundred dollar payment
for tree removal to the landowners in the case, even though there
150. Id. at 277.
151. Id. at 277-79.
152. Id. at 277.
153. See id. at 281.
154. See Miller, 276 U.S. at 279-81.
155. Id. at 277. ("[P]laintiffs in error challenged the constitutionality of the statute un-




158. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 716.
159. Miller, 276 U.S. at 277.
318
LECH'S MESS
was no dispute that neither the lower court's decision nor the "stat-
ute as interpreted allow[ed] [for] compensation" to the landown-
ers.1" How then can the Tenth Circuit hold that compensation
should be withheld from the Lechs here in the face of "unfair" cir-
cumstances thrown upon them?1 61
Third, the Miller opinion supported limits to a state's right
to extinguish private property rights without paying just compensa-
tion, not, as the Tenth Circuit suggests, a categorical exception to
just compensation when a state acts pursuant to its police powers.162
Take, for example, the cases Miller cited to in reaching its deci-
sion.163 Each are regulatory cases that acknowledge limits on the
state's police power to regulate the use of property withoutjust com-
pensation.fA Eventually, the Supreme Court explained in Mahon,
six years before the Miller opinion, that the government can go "too
far" in regulating the private uses of property, at which point, it ef-
fects a taking. 165
And lastly, it was crucial to the Miller Court's holding that
the decision to destroy cedars was the outcome of a thorough and
well-reasoned debate about Virginia's public welfare." As Judge
Stone expounded, "red cedar, aside from its ornamental use, has
occasional use and value as lumber,"167 and while native to Virginia,
it "is not cultivated or dealt in commercially on any substantial scale,
and its value throughout the state is shown to be small as compared
with that of the apple orchards of the state."168 Growing apples, on
the other hand, was among the state's dominant agricultural
160. Id.
161. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 717.
162. Compare Miller, 276 U.S. at 277 (allowing compensation of $100 for exercise of state
police power) with Lech 2, supra note 11, at 10 (stating Miller "[did] not require state to
compensate").
163. See Miller, 276 U.S. at 279-80 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926); Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916); Hadacheck v.
Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Sligh v.
Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde
Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878)).
164. Id.
165. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
166. Miller, 276 U.S. at 279-80.
167. Id. at 279.
168. Id.
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activities. 1 9 And unfortunately, this activity was the chief victim of
cedar rust.7 0 Considering the significant financial investment in
Virginia's apple orchards, which provided employment for many
people and brought about development of related transportation
and storage facilities, the Commonwealth of Virginia was well within
its constitutional powers to "destr[oy] one class of property in order
to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, [was] of
greater value to the public."1 7 1 However, no such reasoned debate
concerning legislative priorities occurred in the Lechs' case.1 72 In-
stead, the Lechs' home was destroyed by executive decision, in the
heat of the moment, without debate of the potential value to the
public of providing just compensation in this circumstance.
III. WHAT THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING MEANS FOR
FUTURE CASES
Notwithstanding the inapposite holdings in Mugler, Bennis,
and Miller, the Tenth Circuit nevertheless took it upon itself to cre-
ate an unprecedented exception to the Just Compensation Clause
in its opinion in Lech.173 Strongly worded, the Tenth Circuit's hold-
ing reads as follows:
[W]hen the state acts pursuant to its police power,
rather than the power of eminent domain, its actions
do not constitute a taking for purposes of the Tak-
ings Clause ... [and this] distinction remains dispos-
itive in cases that, like this one, involve the direct
physical appropriation or invasion of private prop-
erty. 174
Purportedly required by the Takings Clause, which, as the
Tenth Circuit puts it, "simply does not entitle all aggrieved owners
to recompense," this holding does not just sit at odds only with
169. Id.
170. Id. at 277 (under the statute challenged, "the state entomologist, ordered the
plaintiffs in error to cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar trees growing on
their property, as a means of preventing the communication of a rust or plant disease with
which they were infected to the apple orchards in the vicinity.").
171. Id. at 279.
172. See generally Lech 2, supra note 11, at 714-19.




historic Supreme Court cases-it defies more recent cases as well. 175
This will have serious and far reaching consequences on takings law
as we know it. As recently as 2012, for example, the Supreme Court
wrote at length about the perils of establishing bright-line takings
rules in Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States.17' There, the U.S.
government intentionally flooded the petitioner's land pursuant to
its police powers, and the landowners claimed that such flooding
effected a taking.7 7 In ruling in the landowners' favor, the Court
expounded on its disapproval of the lower court's holding that
"Government-induced flooding can give rise to a takings claim ...
only if the flooding is permanent or inevitably recurring."17 8
The Takings Clause is designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole. And when the gov-
ernment physically takes possession of an interest in
property for some public purpose, it has a categorical
duty to compensate the former owner. These guides
are fundamental in our Takings Clause jurispru-
dence. We have recognized, however, that no magic
formula enables a court to judge, in every case,
whether a given government interference with prop-
erty is a taking. In view of the nearly infinite variety
of ways in which government actions or regulations
can affect property interests, the Court has recog-
nized few invariable rules in this area. True, we have
drawn some bright lines, notably, the rule that a per-
manent physical occupation of property authorized
by government is a taking. So, too, is a regulation that
permanently requires a property owner to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses of his or her land.
But aside from the cases attended by rules of this or-
der, most takings claims turn on situation-specific factual
inquiries.171
This makes sense. What is, and what is not, a taking is often
a difficult question to answer. In large part, because government
actions affect property in "tangential . . . [and] completely
175. Id. (citations omitted).
176. Ark. Game & Fish Comrm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31-32 (2012).
177. Id. at 26.
178. Id. at 31 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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unanticipated ways."" That is precisely why the Supreme Court
frowns on bright line takings rules like the one in Lech."' Unfortu-
nately, however, after the Tenth Circuit's opinion, district courts
will not have much discretion to operationalize any other kind of
rule.182 Future courts will necessarily be limited from applying any
sort of ad hoc factual inquiry to police power takings cases as a con-
sequence of the Tenth Circuit's opinion.' 8 3 Their job will be fairly
perfunctory: did the government act pursuant to its police powers?
If so, then there is no taking.
This prohibition against ad hoc inquiries into whether a gov-
ernment's use of its police powers effected a taking will create a fun-
damental shift in how we interpret the Takings Clause. Examine
what would have happened had the Lech holding applied to various
historic Supreme Court cases. Take, for example United States v. Pe-
wee Coal Co., '4 where the United States used its police powers to
take over operations of a coal mine whose workers had recently
gone on strike.8" Had the United States not acted, the Government
argued, the strikes might have prevented "the effective prosecution
of [World War II] by curtailing vitally needed production in the
coal mines directly affecting the countless war industries and trans-
portation systems dependent upon such mines."186 Although the
Government's operation of these private mines was clearly author-
ized under the Government's police powers, the Supreme Court
nevertheless held that these actions effected a taking. 87 But, ac-
cording to Lech, the Supreme Court was wrong. As the Tenth Circuit
put it, "when the state acts pursuant to its police power, rather than
the power of eminent domain, its actions do not constitute a taking
for purposes of the Takings Clause."188 Thus, the Government
180. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'i Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
324 (2002).
181. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 568 U.S. at 31-32.
182. See Theodore Eisenberg, A peal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Fur-
ther Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 659
(2004) (Appeals are only "filed in 10.9 percent of filed cases," so it is likely that district
courts will be the ones operationalizing the Lech test).
183. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 324; cf Lech 2, supra note 11, at 717.
184. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 114-22 (1951).
185. Id. at 114.
186. Exec. Order No. 9340: Possession and Operation of Coal Mines, 8 Fed. Reg. 5,695
(May 1, 1943).
187. See Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. at 115-16.
188. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 717.
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could not have been held to have effected a taking where it was op-
erating pursuant to its police powers in counteracting the harmful
effects of a coal industry strike.
The Lech Court's opinion would have also required a differ-
ent result in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council.18 9 There, the South Caro-
lina legislature used its police powers to pass the Beachfront Man-
agement Act, "which had the direct effect of barring [landowners]
from erecting any permanent habitable structures on [their
land]." " Although there was no dispute that the Act was validly en-
acted pursuant to the state's police power,191 the Supreme Court
nevertheless held that the Act effected a taking as to the petition-
ers.19 2 According to Lech, the Supreme Court also reached the
wrong result in this case. This incongruous result is a consequence
of the Lech holding, which is not limited to physical takings cases.19'
Rather, it applies to regulatory takings and physical takings cases
alike.194 Thus, the Lech opinion requires foundational Supreme
Court regulatory takings cases like Lucas to be overturned.
IV. CONCLUSION
Hardly confined to the Pewee Coal Co. and Lucas cases, the
Lech opinion would have reversed the holdings in countless other
takings cases.195 This inappropriate result thus begs the obvious
question-what will be done about this case? And, perhaps unsur-
prisingly, the answer appears to be a resounding "nothing." When
189. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992).
190. Id. at 1007.
191. Id. at 1009.
192. Id. at 1019.
193. Lech 2, supra note 11, at 717.
194. Id. ("[W]hen the state acts pursuant to its police power, rather than the power of
eminent domain, its actions do not constitute a taking for purposes of the Takings Clause .
.. [and this] distinction remains dispositive in cases that, like this one, involve the direct
physical appropriation or invasion of private property." (emphasis added)). The Lech
Court's use of the word remains implies that this rule extends to regulatory cases as well.
195. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31-32 (2012).
The Government intentionally flooded property pursuant to its police powers, so Lech
would have categorically exempted the Government from paying Just Compensation. See
also Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 174-78 (1871). The Government also inten-
tionally flooded property pursuant to its police powers, so Lech would have categorically
exempted the Government from payingJust Compensation. See also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922). Pennsylvania used its police powers to restrict a company from
mining subsistence coal, so Lech would have categorically exempted the Government from
paying Just Compensation in this case as well.
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it was given the opportunity, the Supreme Court denied writ of cer-
tiorari for the Lechs' case.96 And it is truly unfortunate that it did.
As various periodicals have explained, this "ordeal financially up-
ended the Lech family's life,"19 7 and without Supreme Court review,
the Lechs' pain will be cemented in place. For example, Leo Lech
had to take out a $390,000 loan to tear down the remains of his
home in addition to incurring $28,000 in legal fees.198 Why would
the Supreme Court tolerate such an injustice?
However unsatisfying, the answer may merely be bad timing.
Unluckily, the Lechs' writ of certiorari was submitted for review in
the middle of the summer of 2020,19 which also happened to be
the height of the George Floyd murder protests.200 A key aspect of
this social movement was questioning whether police militarization
had "gone too far." 2 01 As some have already noted, the Lechs' case
may have been seen as a "microcosm" for these issues because of
the weapons and equipment the Police used to destroy the Lechs'
home.202 Granting certiorari then may have been seen as tacit sup-
port for the police de-militarization movement in particular, and
the George Floyd protests in general. In this context, it is unsurpris-
ing then that certiorari was denied for the Lechs case along with
"several [other] cases on qualified immunity" that were also denied
during the Lechs' term.203
196. Lech v. Jackson, No. 19-1123, 2020 WL 3492667, at *1 (U.S. June 29, 2020) ("Peti-
tion for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit de-
nied.").
197. Billy Binion, A SWAT Team Blew Up This Family's House While Chasing a Shoplifter.
The Supreme Court Won't Hear the Case., REASON (June 29, 2020, 3:50 PM), https://rea-
son.coin/2020/06/29/swat-team-police-leo-lech-supreme-court-5th-amendien t.
198. Id.
199. Search Results for Docket No.19-1123, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. (Mar. 16, 2020),
h ttps://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/h tnl/pu-
blic/19-1123.html.
200. See Protests across the globe after George Floyd's death, CNN (June 13, 2020, 3:22 PM),
h ttps://www.cn n.con/2020/06/06/world/gallery/intl-george-floyd-protests/index.html.
201. See Shirsho Dasgupta & Tara Copp, Police departments equip, train and sometimes dress
like soldiers - at what cost?, MCCLATCHY DC (July 7, 2020, 3:56 PM),
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/arti-
cle243760662.htmnl#storylink=cpy.
202. Binion, supra note 195 ("The Lech case is a microcosm for several discussions
around what needs to change. There was the intensely militarized presence: why does ap-
prehending a petty thief necessitate grenades and armored vehicles? There was a rather
plain violation of the homeowners' constitutional rights. And there was-and is-the lack




Whatever the reasons behind the denial of certiorari for the
Lechs' case, the fact remains that, absent review, the Lech holding
jeopardizes the constitutional protections in place meant to ensure
the security of property. As Justice Scalia explained in Lucas, when
"the uses of private property [are] subject to unbridled, uncompen-
sated qualification under the police power," as it is under the Lech
opinion, "the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to ex-
tend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappeared."2 04 Indeed, these were the considerations behind the
creation of "the oft-cited maxim that, while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking."20 5
While the consequences of the Lech holding may not be
readily apparent, it is only a matter of time before they fully mani-
fest. Now is our opportunity to act before others, like the Lechs, will
have "to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."2 6 AsJustice Brewer once
wrote, no one person should be asked to "surrender[] to the public
something more and different from that which is exacted from
other members of the public."207 Let us act quickly now so that we
can ensure that does not happen. If we do not, we risk allowing
more innocent property owners to suffer the consequences of our
inaction.
204. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
205. Id. (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415).
206. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1990).
207. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
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